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Kenya's 1997 Making Sense of the
Elections Transition Process
Rok Ajulu
The transition process in Kenya appears to be getting nowhere. Six years after the
opening of democratic space, politics, political institutions, and governance re-
main predominantly stuck in the authoritarian quagmire of the past. Lack of
broader participation in decision-making processes and absence of consensus
around important issues of governance appear to be the norm rather than the ex-
ception. Indeed, Kenya's democracy experiment appears to defy conventional de-
mocratization models and discourse. It refuses to comply with prescriptive models
developed by various Western scholars as the so-called liberal democratic values
stubbornly refuse to take root in the country. This article attempts to explain why
this is the case in Kenya. It is part of a broader study that focuses on the political
economy of democratization in Kenya. The central thrust of the argument here is
that in order to understand the crisis of democratization in Kenya, there is a need
to focus on the political economy of accumulation, particularly on how it has been
mediated politically over the post-colonial period.
Polling for the Kenyan election of 1997, the second since the advent of the 1922
"democracy experiment," began on December 29, and the electoral process was
finally completed throughout the country and a new government formed during the
first week of January 1998, with fairly predictable results. President Daniel Arap Moi
was returned to office with 40.4 percent of the vote. Though Moi was still very much a
minority president, his performance was a marginal improvement over the 1992 elec-
tion, when he scraped through with 36 percent. His party, the ruling Kenya African
National Union (KANU), did not acquit itself well either. It managed to win only 107
of the 210 contested parliamentary seats. Even with the additional six of the twelve
proportionately allocated nominated seats, the ruling party still lacked a comfortable
working majority.
Faced with a hopelessly divided opposition at the beginning of 1997, President Moi
and senior officials of the ruling party had banked on KANU's winning the elections
convincingly. The entry into the political ring of the National Convention Council, the
reform movement under the leadership of its executive, the National Convention Execu-
tive Committee, halfway through 1997, however, began to change the balance of forces.
By July 1997 the reform movement had President Moi pinned against the wall, and
KANU was subsequently forced to make concessions to render the elections possible.
Following the KANU-initiated Inter-Party Parliamentary Group deal, in which minimal
constitutional changes relaxed rules for the electoral process, elections finally took
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place, but not entirely in President Moi's favor. As a result, some argue, the president
spent so much time and energy securing the presidency that there was no time to attend
to the parliamentary seats. The result: a razor-thin majority in Parliament, a highly
flawed process, and a pyrrhic victory for President Moi was achieved at a rather high
price for the continued political stability of the country.
Background to the Election
Yet all this could have been predicted long before the elections. Ever since Moi was
pressured into conceding political space and embracing political pluralism, he made it
rather clear that democratization was not part of his broader agenda. He had accepted
multipartyism, he told a BBC television interviewer in 1992, because of the pressure
from Western powers. 1 In fact, the political processes since the opening of democratic
space in 1991 have been about reversing rather than deepening the democratization
experiment. The lack of broader participation in decision-making processes and absence
of consensus around important issues of governance appear to be the most recognizable
trademarks of President Moi's regime. It was always an exercise in political sophistry to
imagine that the regime was interested in conducting an election which could result in
its loss of control of state power. Indeed, such an exercise would be contrary to what
can be called its class interest. It is not surprising, therefore, that developments in the
runup to the 1997 elections bore striking similarity to the 1992 period, which had pro-
duced a similarly controversial result. Let us look at those events briefly.
At the beginning of 1997 the opposition parties remained as divided as they had
been over the previous four years. Numerous attempts to unite the opposition had failed
dismally, The elusive search for a single opposition candidate against the incumbent
President Moi, a political exercise that had occupied the opposition over the entire pe-
riod of the opening of the democratic space, had yet to produce any tangible result. At
the time, therefore, Moi appeared to be cruising comfortably to a fifth and supposedly
final term. By midyear, however, the entry of the reform movement, the amalgam of
civil society groups under the leadership of the National Convention Executive Council
(NCEC) into the political ring under the slogan No Reforms No Election began to
change the balance of forces.
The NCEC's political mobilization, which started with the Limuru Convention on
constitutional reforms, culminated across the country in a series of rallies demanding
fundamental reforms before an election could take place. The turning point came on
July 7, Saba Saba Day, the anniversary of a memorable uprising in the capital city seven
years earlier, which had signaled the beginning of the multiparty campaign. The violent
confrontation between the state security apparatuses — Moi's feared paramilitary force,
the General Service Unit — and the opposition alliance left ten people, most of them
students, dead and hundreds injured. 2 A week later, the security forces again stormed a
peace prayer in Nairobi's main Anglican church, All Saints Cathedral, and left a promi-
nent church leader and opposition activist, the Reverend Njoya, for dead. 3 The original
Saba Saba in 1990 had sparked an almost identical pattern when thousands of people
gathered at Kamkunji in Nairobi for a pro-democracy rally.4
Hot on the heels of these events came the ethnic cleansing in Coast province. The
violence that had started as an ordinary criminal raid into the local Likoni police sta-
tion, in which several policemen were killed, the armory broken into, guns and ammu-
74
nition stolen, and the police station burnt down, soon assumed political dimensions. A
few days later, the death toll had risen to twenty, the attack spread into Likoni and
Kwale districts, and it was increasingly targeted at up-country people. Furthermore, it
was beginning to emerge that these were no ordinary criminals, for the attackers tar-
geted churches associated with displaced persons, predominantly up-country, that is,
noncoastal individuals, mainly Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups. The government proved
either unable or unwilling to deal with the situation decisively. As the violence moved
into its second week with a reported death toll close to fifty, and the government neither
able to stem the tide of rumors nor contain the violence, parallels began to be drawn
with the ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley province in the runup to the 1992 multiparty
elections.
Overnight the government lost the political initiative to a section of the opposition
and its allies within the National Convention Assembly. According to a report by the
Kenya Human Rights Commission, the government for a while considered postponing
elections until such a time as it had recaptured the political initiative from the National
Convention Assembly, which throughout July and August of that year was on the offen-
sive. 5 Against this background the Coast Violence came to be seen as a strategy un-
leashed by the state to achieve certain objectives. One of these was to create an environ-
ment that would have served as a convenient pretext for declaring a state of emergency.
The other, of course, had to do with undermining the demographic strength of the
opposition parties in a number of constituencies in the Coast province in the runup to
the election. The large populations of the Luo, Kikuyu, and Luhya have often been
considered a crucial swing factor in the Coast electoral calculations. It is not surprising,
therefore, that most observers of Kenyan politics saw in the Coast ethnic eruption a
repeat of the 1991-1992 ethnic cleansing, which engulfed the whole of the Rift Valley
province and sections of Nyanza and Western provinces. Clearly the Moi regime did not
intend to level the playing field. But the international outcry that followed the violent
scenes of confrontation in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi, captured live by international
TV networks, ultimately forced President Moi to concede to opposition demands for
constitutional reforms before the general elections.
This he did through setting up the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG), a
KANU platform which had been designed to blunt the impact of the reform agenda of
the opposition and its allies in the National Convention Council. The Convention's
Executive Committee saw this as a means "to cool the fire raised by the NCEC action
and by the demands of the country for electoral reform, and in the process to legitimise
the Moi re-election machine,"6 a feat that President Moi achieved with remarkable suc-
cess.
On the surface, the IPPG achieved a remarkable breakthrough: the Constitution was
amended by the National Assembly in October and November 1 997 so as to render the
country a de jure multiparty democracy; the Public Order Act (Cap 56) was amended to
facilitate freedom of assembly; section 33 of the Constitution was amended so that
nominated members of Parliament (MPs) are proposed on a pro rata basis by all parlia-
mentary parties with a minimum of seven MPs. More important, the electoral process
was supposedly delinked from the state apparatuses:
• The Electoral Commission (EC) was mandated to manage the campaign
process without interference by the provincial administration.
• The EC was to have powers to hire prosecutors to expedite the process
of election petition.
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• The EC was to have powers to monitor fair coverage by Kenya Broad-
casting Corporation radio and television.
The IPPG thus made it possible for President Moi to kill two birds with one stone, so to
say. On the one hand, he was able to recapture the political initiative from NCEC and
seemingly legitimate his reelection machine. On the other, he was able to satisfy the
demands of the international donor community, which had insisted on there being some
basic reforms (largely undefined), particularly after the NCEC had taken to the streets
and threatened ungovernability and political instability.
In practice, however, President Moi made sure that the reform package remained less
impressive in practice than on paper. As the commission chairperson admitted two
weeks before the election, the law did not give the commission power to ensure that the
election was free and fair. He conceded that there was little the commission could do
about unfair coverage of the opposition parties by the state-owned Kenya Broadcasting
Corporation. 7
It is therefore not surprising that the provincial administration continued as if the
amendments had not been passed at all. In the Rift Valley province, President Moi's
stronghold, the Keiyo district commissioner is reported to have urged the local commu-
nity to vote KANU in the following words:
As [I am] an employee of Kanu government, my livelihood depends on the very
same system. Therefore I would not shy away from praying that President Moi be
re-elected once more, to enable me to remain the DC. . . . Better the devil you are
used to than the angel you do not know. It is scary to hear of these parties who
usually claim that once they take over power from Kanu, they would dismantle the
provincial administration and clip off powers of the police. Who will entertain
that?8
Most of the officials in provincial administration would have been of the same opinion.
The determination to retain their jobs under the "devil you are used to" certainly ranked
much higher than any hypothetical ideas of commitment to democracy and fair play.
Thus, confronted with a powerless Electoral Commission, the actual process of manag-
ing the election remained in their hands.
And so, just as in 1992 when President Moi did just enough to legitimate the elec-
toral process, the outcome was never in serious doubt. The idea that the elections were
unlikely to be free and fair was one that was widely accepted in the runup to the elec-
tion. It would seem that not much had changed during the previous five years. Indeed,
the democracy experiment in Kenya demonstrates that it is possible to have multiparty
elections every five years without changing anything.
The Election Results
Largely owing to a divided opposition, the incumbent president was returned to office
on a minority vote and the ruling party gained a slim majority in the newly elected
Parliament. As in the 1992 election, ethnic mobilization emerged as a central feature of
the democratization experiment in Kenya. The electoral process was flawed and highly
controversial; more significantly, the outcome was divisive and highly prone to the
influence of ethnic separatism.
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To understand this necessitates a brief analysis of the 1997 elections results. For
purposes of this examination, the main political players have been selected according to
the following criteria: political parties that have more than ten members in Parliament
and whose presidential candidates were seen or perceived to be serious contenders for
the presidency (see Table 1).
Table 1
The 1997 Kenya Elections:




























Source: Compiled from Electoral Commission of Kenya, Parliamentary Election Results,
January 1998.
Note; KANU: Kenya African National Union; DP: Democratic Party, NDPK; National
Democratic Party of Kenya; F(K): Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), Kenya;
SDP: Social Democratic Party.
To situate the election results in perspective, one must understand the ethnic composi-
tion of Kenya's provinces. Kenya has more than forty ethnic groups ranging in number
from a few hundred to several million. The three largest ethnic groups are Kikuyu (21
percent), Luhya (14 percent), and Luo (13.5 percent). They occupy three distinct prov-
inces, Central, Nyanza, and Western, respectively. Three districts in Nyanza are occu-
pied by the Bantu Kuria and Gusii (5 percent) who have ten seats between them. The
Luhya of the Western province, however, do not constitute one homogeneous ethnic
group. The Luhya is, in fact, a combination of sixteen different subethnic groups —
Bukusu, Idakho, Isukha, Kabras, Khayo, Kisa, Marama, Maragoli, Marachi, Banyala,
Banyore, Samia, Techoni, Tiriki, Tsotso, and Wanga. It is believed that this segmenta-
tion into rival subethnic groups explains why the Western province has never voted as a
single bloc as do its Luo neighbors or the Kikuyu of Central province.
The Kamba (11 percent) occupy the Eastern province, which they share with the
Meru Tharaka (5 percent). The Rift Valley province is occupied by the Kalenjin (11
percent), the Masai, Turkana, Samburu, Iteso (5 percent), and a large population of
Kikuyu "immigrants," those who settled in the province as a result of colonial land
dispossession at the beginning of the century and are often referred to as the Kikuyu
diaspora. It is also important to point out that the Kalenjin do not comprise a single
ethnic croup but like the Luhya are a combination of several Nilotic subethnic groups
— Kipsigis, Nandi, Pokot, Elgeyo, Marakwet, Keiyo, Tugen, Sabaot, Dorobo, and
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Terik. Together they form what is generally known as the Kalenjin. 9
The Coast province is occupied by a number of ethnic groups — Taveta, Pokomo,
Swahili, Bajun, and Mjikenda — which together constitute about 6 percent of the total
population. Mombasa, the provincial capital, is metropolitan with substantial represen-
tation from the big four — Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, and Kamba. As a metropolitan capital,
the Nairobi province is predominantly composed of ethnic groups with the highest in-
stances of proletarianization. The balance, however, is skewed heavily in favor of the
Kikuyu, which explains why they have traditionally dominated the parliamentary seats
in Nairobi. In fact the Kikuyu almost seem to regard Nairobi as "theirs."
Given the ethnic composition of the political parties, the patterns of ethnic support
are very easy to identify. Just as in 1992, Table 1 shows, the ruling party Kenya African
National Union victory represented an alliance of the minority ethnic groups — Coast,
North-Eastern, Eastern, Rift Valley, Western provinces, and eight seats from the Kuria
and Kisii of Nyanza. KANU was virtually locked out of Nairobi (one seat), Central (no
seat), and Luo Nyanza (no seat). It is equally significant to observe that as in the 1992
elections, areas of minority ethnic groups had proportionately more constituencies in
relation to their populations. Thus Nairobi province, with a registered voter population
of around 680,000, had only eight parliamentary seats compared with North-Eastern's
142,000 for ten seats; Eastern province has thirty-two seats to Central's twenty-five for
almost the same number of voting population. 10 This clearly demonstrates the uneven
nature of the playing field.
In the absence of Kenneth Matiba's FORD-Asili party, the Democratic Party's Mwai
Kibaki emerged as the authentic Kikuyu candidate. Matiba had argued for a boycott of
the elections unless fundamental reforms were put in place and refused to register in the
voters roll, thereby disqualifying himself from standing and from voting in the elec-
tions. This led FORD-Asili to split in two, with Martin Shikuku, the secretary-general,
retaining the original FORD-Asili name and Kimani wa Nyoike, a Matiba supporter,
registering as FORD-People. Matiba denounced both factions, thereby denying them a
reasonable chance of garnering electoral support.
Kibaki collected five of the eight seats in Nairobi, seventeen of the Kikuyu seats in
Central province including five from the Kikuyu diaspora and eight from Eastern prov-
ince, but, notably, only from the Menu and Embu sections of the Eastern province. Thus
the old Gikuyu Menu Embu Alliance (GEMA) held on rather well. Following the split
within the former official opposition, FORD-Kenya, Kijana Wamalwa's FORD-K, and
Raila Odinga's National Development Party of Kenya (NDPK) were reduced to Bukusu
and Luo parties, respectively. Raila was able to exclude KANU and other parties from
the Luo Nyanza picking, winning all but two seats. The eight seats from the Kuria and
Kisii districts of Nyanza went to KANU and FORD-K. Wamalwa, however, was unable
to do the same in Western province and lost fifteen seats to KANU, but he did get two
seats from the Luo heartland, that is, Ugenya and Gem in Siaya district, and two from
South and West Mugirango in Kisii district.
Thus of Raila's (NDPK ) twenty-one seats, nineteen came from Nyanza and one each
from Nairobi and Central provinces. Wamalwa's FORD-K was represented in at least
four provinces — Nyanza, Western, Rift Valley, and Eastern. The other new party, Char-
ity Ngilu's and Professor Peter Anyang-Nyongo's Social Democratic Party (SDP), was
able to collect ten seats in Ukambani as was expected, but was a disappointment in
Kiambu in the Central province where it had been expected to collect the Matiba vote.
It nonetheless managed to get five seats from Kiambu and one from Nairobi, but, of
78
more significance, none from Nyanza, where the parly leader, Professor Nyongo, man-
aged only a third place in the Kisumu rural constituency.
These figures are more or less replicated in the presidential vote as shown in Table 2.
Once again, KANU's President Moi had solid support in minority regions with more
than 61 percent in the Coast province, 73 percent in the North-Eastern province, and 69
percent in the Rift Valley province. He also managed a comfortable 44.67 percent in the
Western province and more than 35 percent in the Eastern province, easily meeting the
25 percent in five provinces requirement. Kibaki managed to get 25 percent or more in
only three provinces; his best showing was in Central province among the Kikuyu,
where he garnered more than 88 percent of the votes. The rest of the candidates were
"one-province" candidates. Wamalwa garnered only 48 percent in his own backyard in
Western Kenya; Charity Ngilu won 32.35 percent in her Eastern province, and Raila did
slightly better at 56.55 percent in Nyanza— he certainly lacked the clout to better the
popular appeal his late father, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, exerted when he won 75 per-
cent of the vote in Nyanza in the 1992 elections. Both the 1992 and 1997 elections
confirm the overwhelming centrality of ethnicity in political mobilization.
This voting pattern represents a trend that has been observable in Kenya throughout
its thirty-six years of political independence, that is, ethnic mobilization for control of
Table 2 The 1997 Kenya General Elections:
Presidential Vote by Province
Province Moi Kibaki Raila Kijan Ngilu
KANU D P NDPK FORDK SDP
Nairobi 75,272 160,124 59,415 24,971 39,707
20.56% 44% 16.23% 6.82% 10.85%
Coast 229,084 50,540 22,794 11,156 37,600
61.05% 13.4% 6.07% 2.97% 10.02%
North- 46,121 11,741 210 4418 366
Eastem 73.08% 18.60% 0.33% 7.00% 0.58%
Eastern 368,801 296,262 7,755 7,009 332,578
35.87% 28.81% 0.75% 0.68% 32.35%
Central 55,822 885,382 6,812 3,067 29A73
5.59% 88.73% 0.68% 0.31% 2.95%
Rift- 140,109 343,529 36,022 102,178 11,345
Valley 69% 20.90% 2.19% 6.22% 0.69%
Western 314,669 9,755 13A58 338,120 3,429
44.67% 1.38% 1.91% 48.00% 0.49%
Nyanza 215,923 138,194 519,259 14,623 15,309
23.52% 15.05% 56.55% 1.59% 1.57%
Total 2,445,801 1,895,527 665,725 505,542 469,907
Source: Weekly Review, January 9, 1998.
Note: The other candidates were: Martin Shikuku (FORD-Asili), Katama Mkangi (Kenya National
Congress), George Anyona (Kenya Social Congress), Kimani wa Nyoike (FORD-People). Koigi
wa Wamwere (Kenya National Democratic Alliance), Munywa Waiyaki (United Patriotic Party of
Kenya), Godfrey Mwireria (Green Africa Party), Wangari Mathai (Economiclndependence
Party ), David Waweru Ng.ethe (Umma Patriotic Party).
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state power. During the short-lived multiparty period from 1963 to the "Little General
Election" of 1966, the personalities and the parties were different but the voting pat-
terns were strikingly similar to the last two multiparty elections. It will be recalled that
the then opposition party, Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), in which Presi-
dent Moi and his present coalition were leading figures, drew its support mainly from
the Coast and Rift Valley provinces and parts of Western province. The ruling Kenya
African National Union (KANU) then headed by Jomo Kenyatta with the late Jaramogi
Oginga Odinga as his deputy, drew its support from Central, Nyanza, Nairobi, and East-
ern provinces and parts of Western province. In 1966, when Odinga walked out of the
ruling party to found his short-lived Kenya People Union (KPU), the KPU failed to
cultivate a presence outside Odinga's Luo base in Nyanza, and in the ensuing Little
General Election, all except one of the KPU MPs came from Odinga's Luo stronghold
in Nyanza.
The following discussion considers the implications that can be inferred from these
events for democratization in Kenya.
Ethnicization of Political Contestation
The Kenyan experience represents a case of a "ruling class" determined to hold on to
political power at all costs. The key question however is, What makes it behave in this
particular manner? The argument has been presented elsewhere that in order to under-
stand the roots of political crisis and obstacles to democratization in Kenya, we must
focus attention on the character of the post-colonial state in Kenya, particularly its
forms of accumulation over the past thirty years or so, and the character of the class
forces which have traditionally controlled the state and, more important, how power has
been mediated. 11
The premise is that politics is about the conscious processes of sorting out contesta-
tion over resources, cooperation, and negotiations in the use, production, and distribu-
tion of resources, and the inevitable disputes arising from calculations about winners
and losers. 12 In Kenya these processes have historically been regulated by authoritarian
means mediated through mobilized ethnicity. These ethnic identities were constructed
under colonialism and bequeathed to the incoming independent state almost in their
entirety. The post-colonial state, however, went a step further, for it ethnicized political
contestation precisely because this was the only medium through which the new elite
could best consolidate its political power.
Another form of colonial legacy that was reproduced in post-colonial Kenya is the
centrality of the state in economic activity and particularly the role of the state as the
driver of the process of accumulation, easily the largest single dispenser of patronage
and resources. The colonial state was central in the sense that it was the only organized
institution capable of guaranteeing the reproduction of the conditions of colonial accu-
mulation. Precisely the same role was to be assumed by the post-colonial state. Hence
control of the state or proximity to those who had access to state power became the
main preoccupation of politics. Yes, politics is generally about control of (state) power.
The point, however, is that in societies characterized by an uneven development of
capitalist relations of production, ethnic inequalities of the type that characterize
Kenya, and high instances of extra-economic coercion, are all political activity centers
around gaining control of the state.
This has been the major defining characteristic of Kenyan politics over the entire
period of its independence. And precisely because of the uneven development of
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commodity relations, which in the context of Kenya means ethnic inequalities, the
claims made upon the state have been in sharp conflict. Contestation over resources has
increasingly assumed the form of ethnic competition, thus creating fertile ground for
the reconstruction of ethnic identities and ethnicization of political contestation.
Thus it is not surprising that ethnicity increasingly became the most important me-
dium of political mobilization. Successive regimes in Kenya constructed class power
along ethnicized identities, and resources have been contested along similar lines. Bates
makes the mistake of reducing the post-independence ethnic contestation solely to the
distribution of land and, to some degree, misses the class character of ethnicized identi-
ties. 13 The struggles between KANU, KADU, and later KANU and KPU, in the 1960s,
the rivalries between the Luo and Kikuyu ethnic groups throughout the 1970s, and the
intra-Kikuyu rivalry in the dying days of the Kenyatta regime all had one thing in com-
mon: ethnic and subethnic mobilization for control of the post-colonial state. The as-
sumption that the state is the central player in economic development and distribution
of resources underpinned this contestation for state power. This remained the case in the
immediate post-independence decade, and it continues to underpin political practice
even now, notwithstanding the seemingly almost universal triumph of "market funda-
mentalism" during the course of the past fifteen years.
So the main difference between the Kenyatta and the Moi regimes has been the
greater degree and intensity of kleptocracy under the latter. It is important to emphasize
this point because some literature has tended to paint a glowing picture of Kenyatta
while demonizing Moi. 14 But to fully understand the significance for democratization, it
is important to situate Moi's kleptocratic regime in context, namely, the international
economic environment within which it emerged and of course the particular classlike
elements that constitute the ruling coalition.
President Moi's new alliance, particularly the coalition he cobbled together in the
aftermath of the 1982 coup attempt, was a relatively weak economic class. Unlike the
Kenyatta coalition, which had constituted the most prominent pre-colonial and colonial
exponents of primitive accumulation, the Moi coalition initially comprised a compara-
tively impoverished alliance from areas of the country where capitalism had made the
least penetration. 15 Moi's first task was to construct a capital base for his coalition. In
the absence of fresh areas of accumulation, Moi's embryonic accumulators were com-
pelled to "loot" from the old accumulators or, as Ngunyi puts it, the capital base of the
new coalition had to be constructed upon the dissolution of the already entrenched
Kikuyu capital. 16
Bates lists a number of forms of "primitive accumulation" that this alliance was
involved in, but also points out that a sizable element was pure predation, a transfer of
agricultural surpluses to favored regions, particularly the Rift Valley and sections of the
Western province. 17 Clearly, the capture of state power enabled President Moi to shift
the distribution of patronage and resources away from the Kikuyu to "disadvantaged
ethnic groups" previously marginalized by the Kenyatta coalition who bore real eco-
nomic and political grievances against that coalition. This period constituted the popu-
list phase of Moi's regime.
Ultimately, patronage and resources came to be concentrated around President Moi's
own ethnic group, the Kalenjin in general and the Tugen in particular. This process
coincided, as it were, with the consolidation of his coalition in the aftermath of the
1982 coup attempt. Furthermore, Moi like Kenyatta completely politicized the alloca-
tion of public and private investments: roads, educational infrastructure, and agricultural
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investments were directed mainly toward Moi's own political constituency. The new
power was self-consciously a Kalenjin power, and institutions previously dominated by
the Kikuyu were Kalenjinized. Access to university education and to employment in
state parastatals depended on whether one was recognized by the government as a
member of the KANU tribe. This type of distribution of resources and the crude use of
the state for primitive accumulation could only be predicated on authoritarian control.
Not for nothing did Moi abandon the practice of ethno-regional balancing that had
provided a veneer of political legitimation and stability for the Kenyatta regime.
More important, however, is that this system of primitive accumulation fostered a
kleptocratic bourgeoisie whose existence and survival depended very much on its con-
tinued access to this type of authoritarian state. It is not surprising that when confronted
in 1992 with prospects of an open political process and a situation in which state insti-
tutions might have to be subjected to greater public scrutiny and accountability, this
class sought to defend its interests through mobilized ethnicity. In the runup to the 1992
elections, the country witnessed the most brutal ethnic conflict, which bore all the hall-
marks of contemporary ethnic cleansing going on in other more highly publicized
places, most notably parts of former Yugoslavia.
The story of the 1992 ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley province has yet to be told
in full. The available evidence, however, suggests that the killer bands, recruited mainly
from the Kalenjin and Masai supporters of the ruling party, were encouraged by top
officials of the ruling party and the government, with the explicit project of expelling
so-called foreigners from the province. 18 Once again, in the runup to the 1997 elections,
similarly orchestrated violence occurred in the Coast province, parts of Nyanza, and the
Rift Valley province. As indicated above, apart from undermining the demographic
strength of the opposition parties in the areas affected, this kind of ethnic cleansing, of
stoking further violence and political destabilization, is also designed to extract politi-
cal concessions from the center by those who are unable to compete at the national
level. It is indeed the first step toward warlordism, a strategy which in South Africa, for
example, Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party put to very good use in the runup to the
country's first-ever democratic elections in 1994.
Obviously, in accumulation regimes of this type the dominant tendency in politics
is bound to be an inclination toward authoritarian control. This was true of the colonial
state, whose legacy of an emphasis on exerting control has been reproduced in the post-
colonial era quite uncritically, but understandably so, from the point of view of the class
forces that have dominated the state since independence. Some commentators have
suggested that a major obstacle to democratization in Kenya now is not so much this
class disposition but, instead, simply the tactical failure of the opposition parties to
unite and field only one candidate. To the extent that this view appears to equate de-
mocratization with just the removal of President Moi from office, it is fundamentally
flawed. The issue of identifying a single candidate to stand against Moi should be sepa-
rated from the much wider issues of democratic principles, not mere personalities.
While a united opposition would certainly bring an end to the long period of Kenya
African National Union misrule, whether it would engender democracy remains highly
debatable. The question that needs to be addressed is why opposition unity remained
illusory over the last seven years. The answer is that the opposition, just like the ruling
party KANU, is constructed around ethnic identities and has contested political power
on the basis of mobilized ethnicity. Thus it is unlikely to usher in a new and more prin-
cipled discourse and praxis of politics.
82
It will be recalled that the Kenyan opposition at its reconstitution in 1992 repre-
sented a fragile alliance of two main tendencies. The first represented the old classes of
capital and property, predominantly but not exclusively the Kikuyu bourgeoisie, orga-
nized into two antagonistic camps. One of them, the Matiba camp (FORD-Asili), repre-
sented the fraction which had occupied the second tier of the old Kenyatta coalition and
regarded themselves as the true representatives of the Kikuyu rank and file. They had
the support of the Kiambu and Muranga districts of the Central province of Kenya, the
Kikuyu diaspora in Laikipia, Nakuru, and Molo districts of the Rift Valley province,
and more important, in Nairobi and some of the major towns. Matiba's tactical alliance
with Martin Shikuku (Luhya) in 1 992 not only gave him a national image, but, more
significantly, represented a potential alliance of the two of the largest ethnic groups, the
Luhya and the Kikuyu. The Kibaki camp (Democratic Party), in contrast, represented
the hegemonic fraction of the old Kenyatta coalition, the elite of the old Kiambu bour-
geoisie and its Nyeri counterparts, which for all practical purposes must have appeared
as the true representatives of the Kikuyu ethnic group. This group did not do so well in
1992, coming third with 1.03 million votes in the presidential race. But in 1997 and
with Matiba out of the race, the Democratic Party emerged as the true Kikuyu party.
The other tendency of course was the old radical petite bourgeoisie of the main-
stream Kenyan opposition of the late Jaramogi Oginga Odinga's FORD-Kenya. The
latter comprised the old radical traditional opposition, the professional intellectual
middle classes, the so-called Young Turks, and other forces that had been active in the
struggle for democratization throughout the 1980s. But it was a coalition that was built
very much around Odinga and the Luo as its power base, with the support of the
Bukusu subsection of the Luhya, a fact reflected in Odinga's electoral support in the
1992 contest.
Following Odinga's death in 1994, the party leadership passed to Wamalwa Kijana.
The long rivalry between Wamalwa and Odinga's son, Raila, ultimately culminated in
FORD-Kenya disintegrating in three directions: Raila' s NDPK, which reconstituted
itself as the Luo party, Nyongo's SDP, which was seen mainly as the platform for the
presidential candidacy of Charity Ngilu, and finally, original FORD, which now sought
predominantly to reconstitute its base among the Luhya.
At the core of all these considerations- was control of state power. The two Kikuyu
factions needed the state to recapture old areas of accumulation, and the Odinga faction
needed to redress the imbalances of the previous period. These considerations obviously
ruled out any possibilities of a temporary alliance between the main opposition parties.
The same seemed to be the case during the 1997 election.
Thus by their own political practices over the last seven years, the opposition lead-
ers have demonstrated that they are not much different from KANU, which indeed is
the main stem from which all of them have emerged. The proliferation of political par-
ties since 1992 has nothing to do with principles or ideological differences. Rather it is
motivated by political greed and personal ambitions among a group that is capable of
mobilizing ethnic constituencies who have genuine grievances against a central govern-
ment for their own personal political goals. It follows that the assumption that a united
opposition would offer a fundamentally different alternative political force and much
brighter future for democratization in Kenya requires serious reconsideration.
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The Role of the International Financial
Institutions and the Donor Community
The use of Western aid to promote democratization has been one of the main features of
democratic transition in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, it was the intervention of Western
governments and donor agencies in November 1991 that finally persuaded President
Moi to concede political space. A number of scholars have questioned the motives of
the international financial institutions (IFIs) and donor community and the simultaneous
application of seemingly contradictory structural adjustment programs and political
conditionalities to promote democracy. For example, it has been argued that structural
adjustment programs have a tendency to undermine sovereignty and create authoritarian
regimes which are increasingly compelled to implement an antidemocratic set of socio-
economic reforms. Barya, for instance, argues that the new political conditionalities
have nothing to do with the Western countries' commitment to encouraging democracy;
instead, he sees it as an attempt by the most powerful countries to create a new legiti-
macy for the grossly unequal distribution of power and resources in the international
capitalist system in the post-Cold War order. 19
The Kenyan experience would seem to confirm some of these doubts and skepticism.
The stance taken by the IFIs and donor community with respect to the transition process
in Kenya has been hypocritical, contained double standards, and quite blatantly im-
peded the chances of democratization. Indeed, following the 1997 Kenyan election we
cannot now say with any certainty what the West and its agencies mean by democracy,
good governance, and transparency. For the IFIs and bilateral donors quickly reestab-
lished business-as-usual relations with the Moi regime after the 1992 election. That was
notwithstanding the facts that the election was visibly flawed, that the newly elected
government was largely unaccountable, that the human rights record had hardly im-
proved, and all at a time when state-instigated ethnic cleansing had clearly been un-
leashed on Kikuyu residents in the Rift Valley province. Donor agencies and their re-
spective governments appeared to exhibit more concern about the pace of macro-
economic reform, economic liberalization, and accountability to the IFIs than demo-
cratic political progress. Throughout the past five years, the regime has been able to get
away with all kinds of political abuses, including fresh outbursts of ethnic cleansing as
long as it kept its macroeconomic reforms on track. The result is that the Kenyan
economy is probably one of the most liberalized in sub-Saharan Africa, unfortunately
with little corresponding political liberalization.
Of course, the donors did intervene in the runup to the general election in August
1997, once the political mobilization which started with the Limuru Convention had
culminated in yet another Saba Saba and as the crowd once again briefly reentered the
political ring. Radical opposition members and their allies in the National Convention
Executive Council seemed capable of capturing the political initiative, threatening to
make Kenya ungovernable and create political instability. And as happened once before,
President Moi was pressured to concede reform; and just as on the previous occasion,
the reforms were modest in practice but served to legitimate the electoral process in the
eyes of the world. Only a few days after his electoral victory, Moi returned to a theme
that has consistently struck a favorable chord with the donor community. Addressing
businessmen at the Nairobi Stock Exchange, he said, "I want to assure Kenyans and
investor [sic], both local and foreign, that the government places economic growth high
on its agenda ... the stability of macro-economic environment . . . would be assured as
a prerequisite for attracting, investment."20 A week later the London Club of foreign
creditors agreed to reschedule the external debt arrears that had soared to U.S. $560
million. That same week the International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission was in town
and expressed optimism about the country's future. The IMF director for Africa Depart-
ment, Gadwall Gondwe, is quoted as having said that the fund was "keen on ensuring"
that Kenya returns swiftly to economic stability. The country, he asserted, had broadly
met the conditions on good governance and anticorruption.
Around the same time a European Union delegation in Nairobi issued a statement
saying that the threat to suspend aid to Kenya was now lifted; it was quoted as saying,
"The two sides had agreed on a new measure under which the funds would be disbursed
. . . long-standing cooperation between the two sides would continue, notwithstanding
the shortcomings of a general election which the EU described as a step further toward
Kenya's full democratization." 21 And the Japanese government offered to Moi's govern-
ment a grant of KShs 188 million to be spent on the health sector. The Japanese ambas-
sador, Dr. Shinsuke Horiuchi, is reported to have said that "his government was happy
to note Kenya's commitment to addressing various governance issues such as greater
transparency, better management of public expenditures, and combating corruption.-22
This in the aftermath of one of the most flawed electoral processes that the country has
witnessed since it attained political independence thirty-six years ago.
So another controversial election, another round of ethnic cleansing. But as far as the
donor community and the IFIs are concerned, it is business as usual. The transition
process, they argue, constitutes a step in the right direction. In the light of this evidence
Barya's contention that the new political condilionalities have nothing to do with a
commitment by Western countries to encouraging democracy is not so very far-fetched
after all.
The Kenyan experience raises several interesting and interrelated questions for the de-
mocratization process. The first of these concerns the enduring ethnic pluralism. A
political process that can exclude up to 65 percent of the electorate from the political
center stage does not bode well for either democracy or long-term political stability.
Ultimately it can only survive by way of some form of authoritarianism, more so in the
context of Kenya, where among the people who are excluded are substantial ethnic
groups who perceive that they are so excluded precisely because of their ethnic identity.
The danger of a debilitating ethnic war is one very possible outcome of this type of
dispensation.
Second, it is an established view in much of the political science literature on post-
colonial Africa that the "first-past-the-post" electoral system, inherited from Britain's
Westminster parliamentary model of independence, seems to be unsuited to political
economics of the Kenyan type. In societies whose political power is hotly contested
along lines of ethnic cleavages, an electoral system that allows the winner by a minority
vote to take all is simply a recipe for disaster. The winning party is tempted to resort to
undemocratic means to protect its gains and try to legitimate its political control. The
Kenyan situation has not exploded yet, but recent developments certainly are pushing in
that direction, unless of course a workable power-sharing formula can be found.
To this extent, therefore, it can be argued that one of the more positive outcomes of
the last two electoral exercises is a clear message to opposition parties that no single
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ethnic group can win on its own. KANU's victory has been possible precisely because
of astute deployment of state patronage to cobble together a minority alliance that,
rightly or wrongly, fears the perceived domination of the majority ethnic groups. The
need for a more inclusive political system cannot be overemphasized. Perhaps the time
has come for a more serious consideration to be given to the merits of democratic feder-
alism. Unfortunately, in much of sub-Saharan Africa attempts to introduce constitu-
tional reforms to accommodate ethnic diversity have not yet been particularly success-
ful precisely because political autonomy has often been manipulated to pursue sectarian
interests.
A third and equally important question relates to the overall character of the political
system in Kenya today. After two multiparty elections, can we genuinely say that some-
thing fundamental has changed in Kenya? It could be argued that the Moi regime has
very much succeeded in narrowing the political space which was pried open with the
reforms of 1990. Political repression has not abated: yes, detention without trial has
been brought to an end, but as a local lawyer and activist put it, political activism has
increasingly been criminalized. In the meantime, the judicial system has remained un-
der the tight control of the ruling elite, and any legal action against the government or
its protected officials seems bound to fail. Meanwhile, corruption has reached unprec-
edented levels, and the police and other security apparatuses of the state have almost
been transformed into the armed thugs of the ruling party. All of which is certainly a far
cry from what the donor community appears to perceive as a transitional step toward
Kenya's full democratization. **
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